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ABSTRACT 
In August 2019, the Federal Ministry of Justice submitted a draft for a corporate crime 
act. This draft will end a decade-long debate on the criminal liability of legal persons and 
profoundly change the criminal prosecution in the area of economic criminal law. The ar-
ticle classifies the legislative project in the current discourse on criminal policy, reports on 
the content of the draft and gives a critical commentary on individual points.  
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I. PROSECUTION OF CORPORATE CRIME IN GERMANY DE LEGE LATA 
AND DE LEGE FERENDA 
 
In August 2019, the Federal Ministry of Justice, headed by Christine Lambrecht (SPD, 
Social Democratic Party of Germany), presented a draft Act on Combating Corporate 
Crime (hereinafter referred to as the "Draft Act"). The implementation of the project in 
the legislative procedure is expected, subject to possible changes in the details. The Act 
will fundamentally change the prosecution and defense of associations (that is, legal enti-
ties under public or private law, associations without legal capacity and partnerships with 
legal capacity1 ). Knowledge of the new legal material is relevant to economic players 
around the world, to the extent that they establish or operate subsidiaries in Germany or 
are active abroad on behalf of German companies.  
 
According to current German law, companies can already be held liable if, for example, 
the executive board or another management body of the company has committed a crim-
inal offense that enriched the company or resulted in a breach of the company's duties2. 
Since 1968, the statutory provision has been found in § 30 of the Administrative Offenses 
Act (Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten, "OWiG").3 The OWiG is regarded as the "little 
brother" of criminal law. To be sure, the procedure is modeled on criminal proceedings, 
but the fines do not constitute criminal penalties. The imposition of penalties is reserved 
for the judge. By contrast, fines on the basis of the OWiG are imposed by the administra-
tive authorities responsible for punishing administrative offenses. Recourse to the courts 
against this is possible. 
 
Through the 8th Act amending the Act against Restraints of Competition (8. Gesetz zur 
Änderung des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen) of June 26, 2013, the fine 
framework of § 30 OWiG was increased from 1 million euros to 10 million euros. This 
framework may be exceeded if the economic return of the act exceeds the statutory fine 
limit (§ 17 (4) OWiG). The fine of the association to be assessed by the court must include 
a "punishment share" and a "confiscation share." For years, fines in the hundreds of mil-
lions have thus been established (Siemens - 201 million euros, 20074; Audi - 800 million 
			
1  See § 1 (1)(1) VerSanG-E. 
2  More specifically: Imme Roxin, Compliance-Maßnahmen und Unternehmenssanktionierung de lege lata, 9, 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK, 341 et seq. (2018). 
3  For historical development see: HAUKE BRETTEL & HENDRIK SCHNEIDER, WIRTSCHAFTSSTRAFRECHT, §1 
Rn.45. (2nd ed., 2018). 
4  LG München I, Beschluss vom 04.10.2007- 5 KLs 563 Js 45994/07, (Oct. 15, 2019, 02:33 PM), https://open-
jur.de/u/748600.html. 
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euros, 20185). In the VW case, the fine in the "Dieselgate" scandal amounts to 1 billion eu-
ros6. 
 
The introduction of corporate criminal law was already being discussed in the 1950s7. Pro-
posals in this regard were not acceptable to the majority. In particular, German criminal 
law scholars saw the principle of guilt as an insurmountable bulwark against the imposi-
tion of criminal penalties on companies. 8  Moreover, they are only capable of acting 
through their governing bodies, and the social and ethical condemnation found in pun-
ishment is meaningless for companies 9. Policy ultimately followed suit.10 
 
The internationally relevant scandals regarding the exhaust gas manipulations of well-
known German automobile manufacturers, which lend emphasis to demands for a 
tougher approach and make it acceptable to the majority, are certainly responsible for to-
day's change of opinion11. Reference should also be made to the political framework con-			
5  Staatsanwaltschaft II München, Ermittlungsverfahren gegen Verantwortliche der AUDI AG - Bußgeldbe-
scheid gegen die AUDI AG, Pressemitteilung 7 vom 16.10.2018 (Oct. 15, 2019, 02:33 PM), https://www.jus-
tiz.bayern.de/gerichte-und-behoerden/staatsanwaltschaft/muenchen-2/presse/2018/13.php. 
6  Staatsanwaltschaft Braunschweig, VW muss Bußgeld zahlen, Pressmitteilung vom 13.06.2018 (Oct. 15, 2019, 
02:35 PM), https://staatsanwaltschaft-braunschweig.niedersachsen.de/startseite/aktuelles/presseinformatio-
nen/vw-muss-bugeld-zahlen-174880.html. 
7  See Ernst Heinitz, Empfiehlt es sich, die Strafbarkeit der jursitischen Person gesetzlich vorzusehen?, in: Ver-
handlungen des 40. Deutschen Justistentages Band I, 84ff (ed Ständige Deputation des Deutschen Juristenta-
ges, 1953); Karl Engisch, Empfiehlt es sich, die Strafbarkeit der jursitischen Person gesetzlich vorzusehen?, in: 
Verhandlungen des 40. Deutschen Juristentages Band II, E. 22 et seq. (ed. Ständige Deputation des Deutschen 
Juristentages, 1953); overview by Bernd Schünemann, Der Kampf ums Verbandsstrafrecht in dritter Neuauf-
lage, der „Kölner Entwurf eines Verbandssanktionsgesetzes“ und die Verwandlung von Kuratoren in Monitore 
– much ado about something, 8, STRAFVERTEIDIGER FORUM, 317 et seq. (2018) 
8  Bernd Schünemann, Die aktuelle Forderung eines Verbandsstrafrechts – Ein kriminalpolitischer Zombie, 1, 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK, 1 et seq. (2014); Günther Jakobs, Strafbar-
keit juristischer Personen?, in: Festschrift für Klaus Lüderssen : zum 70. Geburtstag, 559 et seq.( ed. Prittwitz, 
2002) Klaus Leipold, Unternehmensstrafrecht – Eine rechtspolitische Notwendigkeit?, 2, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
RECHTSPOLITIK, 34 et seq. (2013). 
9  HANS-HEINRICH JESCHECK & THOMAS WEIGEND, LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHT - ALLGEMEINER TEIL, p. 
227 (1995). 
10  In 1999, a Hessian legislative initiative to introduce responsibility under criminal law for legal persons and as-
sociations of persons in the Bundesrat (BR-Drs. 690/98) was withdrawn again (BR-Drs. 385/99); this was fol-
lowed by a rejection of the introduction of criminal liability for companies by the Commission for the Reform 
of the Criminal Sanction System in Germany in 2000; finally, in 2013, at the suggestion of the Ministry of 
Justice of the State of North Rhine-Westphalia, a draft act of the 84th Conference of Ministers of Justice of 
the Länder followed, which, however, also failed; for details, see Matthias Jahn, "There is no such thing as too 
big to jail" – regarding the constitutional objections to an association criminal code under the Basic Law, in: 
Corporate criminal law and its alternatives, 8 et seq. (eds. - Matthias Jahn, Charlotte Schmitt-Leonardy, Chris-
tian Schoop, 2015). 
11  As such, it comprises symbolic ad hoc legislation, which often represents the engine of a tightening of criminal 
law, see HAUKE BRETTEL & HENDRIK SCHNEIDER, WIRTSCHAFTSSTRAFRECHT, §1 Rn.69 et seq. (2end ed., 
2018); along with Mohamad El-Ghazi, Das schweizerische Unternehmensstrafrecht – Lehren für ein mögliches 	
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ditions (see II). Furthermore, there is a lack of fundamental resistance on the part of crim-
inal science today12. Rather, the concerns regarding corporate criminal law resulting from 
the basic principles of criminal law are being suborned in favor of pragmatism in terms of 
criminal policy13. Traditional European principles are no longer perceived as contempo-
rary14. "Modern criminal law" should be elastic, effective and not limited to "minimally 
invasive" interventions 15. As a whole, it has become obvious that the days when progress 
in criminal law was seen in its abolition16 or at least in decriminalization17 are over. 
II. POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE DRAFT ACT ON COMBATING COR-
PORATE CRIME 
 
Since 2013, Germany has been governed by a "grand coalition" of the CDU/CSU (union 
of Christian democratic parties) and the SPD. Angela Merkel, who has been Chancellor 
of the Federal Republic of Germany without interruption since Nov. 22, 2005, likewise 
governed in the 16th legislative period with a grand coalition and in the following official 
phase with a Black-Yellow coalition together with the FDP (Free Democratic Party, the 
liberal political party in Germany). 
 
After the federal elections in 2013, the Black-Yellow coalition of the 17th legislative period 
was not able to continue, because the FDP was no longer represented in the Bundestag. 
For the first time since the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, the 
party had not passed the so-called "5-percent hurdle." The CDU/CSU (Christian Demo-
cratic Union) had just missed an absolute majority.  
 
Subsequently, the CDU/CSU and SPD, which had already put into effect some topics of 
criminal policy from the spectrum of economic criminal law, formed a government. Such 			
deutsches Verbandsstrafrecht, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT, 1, 254 (2018) on 
the introduction of corporate criminal law in Switzerland in 2003. The discussion regarding the necessity of 
corporate criminal law was triggered by a major fire near Sandoz, during which fire-fighting water contami-
nated with pesticides reached the Rhine and caused the death of fish. 
12  Criticism is mainly limited to individual specific points and does not consist of fundamental criticism, see for 
example: Alexander Baur, Kommt jetzt das “Unternehmensstrafrecht“?, DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, 13-14, 
2018, 457 et seq. (2018).; Katharina Beckemper, Der Kölner Entwurf eines Verbandssanktionengesetzes – Sank-
tionen und Einstellungsmöglichkeiten, 10, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS-, STEUER- UND UNTER-
NEHMENSSTRAFRECHT, 420 et seq. (2018). 
13  Similarly: Urs Kindhäuser, Straf-Recht und ultima-ratio-Prinzip, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DIE GESAMTE STRAF-
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT,129 382 (385) (2017) 
14  For example: Michael Kubiciel, Kriminalpolitik und Strafrechtswissenschaft, JURISTENZEITUNG, 4, 171 (176) 
(2018). 
15  Michael Kubiciel &Elisa Hoven, Gründe für die Reform des Verbandssanktionenrechts, JURISPR-STRFR, 23, 
2017, Anm. 1 (2017). 
16  ARNO PLACK, PLÄDOYER FÜR DIE ABSCHAFFUNG DES STRAFRECHTS (1974). 
17  Hendrik Schneider, Vom bösen Täter zum kranken System. Perspektivenwechsel in der Kriminologie am Bei-
spiel von Psychoanalyse und Kriminalsoziologie, in: Recht und Justiz im gesellschaftlichen Aufbruch (1960-
1975). Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Italien und Frankreich im Vergleich, (ed. Jörg Requate) 275-293 (2003). 
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topics include a tightening of the offenses of "passive and active corruption in the course 
of business" by the second "Act on Combating Corruption," which entered into force on 
November 26, 2015, the "Act on Combating Corruption in Health Care" of June 4, 201618, 
and the "Act on Reform of Asset Skimming under Criminal Law" of July 1, 2017. The 
latter is continuing the trend towards a "fiscalization of criminal law"19 with impressive 
clarity, as the metaphor of "skimming off" simply shows. Whereas, in everyday life, this 
term refers, for example, to the delightful process of removing cream from milk or spoon-
ing milk froth from cappuccinos, the skimming of assets as early as the preliminary pro-
ceedings (that is, prior to conviction) makes it possible to seize assets according to the so-
called "gross value principle."20. This means that not only the profit from the act, but also 
the entire amount obtained, without any deduction of expenses, is subject to recovery in 
favor of the state treasury21. If the measure is directed against individuals or smaller com-
panies, this creates a perfect situation at an early stage of the proceedings, because the co-
ercive measures on the part of the state often lead to insolvency and bankruptcy. In ac-
cordance with applicable law, the relevant proceedings are already directed against a com-
pany if the financial advantages of the illegal transaction did not arise for the perpetrator, 
but for the company. This is intended to achieve preventive successes according to the 
credo "crime may not pay."22 
 
Moreover, in the current 19th legislative period, after a lengthy struggle and weighing of 
various alternatives for forming a government, a coalition agreement was concluded be-
tween the CDU/CSU and the SPD, which is also picking up measures from the spectrum 
			
18  See Hendrik Schneider & Claudia Reich, Honorarkooperationsarztverträge im Spagat zwischen Korruptions-
strafrecht, Arbeits- und Sozialversicherungsrecht, MEDSTRA, 1, 11 et seq. (2019); Hendrik Schneider & Thorsten 
Ebermann, Der Begriff der Zuführung von Patienten in den Tatbeständen Bestechlichkeit und Bestechung im 
Gesundheitswesen, MEDSTRA, 2, 76 et seq. (2018); Hendrik Schneider, Das Gesetz zur Bekämpfung der Korrup-
tion im Gesundheitswesen und die Angemessenheit der Vergütung von HCP, MEDSTRA, 4, 195-203 (2016). 
19  On the subject of fiscalization, see Monika Frommel, Im ideologischen Labyrinth. Was erwarten Demonstran-
tinnen, wenn sie “Weg mit dem Werbeverbot für Schwangerschaftsabbrüche“ rufen?, NEUE KRIMINALPOLI-
TIK, 300 et seq (2018). 
20  Regarding the overview of the reform of asset skimming under criminal law: Gerson Trüg, Die Reform der 
strafrechtlichen Vermögensabschöpfung, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 1913 et seq (2017). 
21  According to Jürgen Taschke, Neue Entwicklungen im Wirtschaftsstrafrecht, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRT-
SCHAFTS-, STEUER- UND UNTERNEHMENSSTRAFRECHT, 274 et seq. (2017), such measures are sufficient to 
combat corporate crime and the sanctions imposed under German law are no less intrusive than the legal con-
sequences imposed in countries with corporate criminal law: "In the major corruption criminal proceedings 
against leading industrial companies and automobile manufacturers, sanctions and – economically even more 
significant – profit skims have been imposed at levels unknown up to now. German sanctions law in no way 
lagged behind American sanctions, which are generally regarded as extremely strict – the criminal sanctions 
imposed on the industrial company Siemens in Germany, for example, were higher than those imposed in the 
U.S." 
22  See speech by Bundestag parliamentarian Luczak (CDU): https://www.cducsu.de/themen/innen-recht-sport-
und-ehrenamt/verbrechen-darf-sich-nicht-lohnen (Nov. 18, 2019, 02:26 PM).. 
		
	 COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |    VOLUME 5   NUMBER 2   2019 
PROF. DR. HENDRIK SCHNEIDER  |   DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH –		
THE DRAFT OF THE ACT ON COMBATING CORPORATE CRIME 
 
PAGE  17 
of economic crime policy. The CDU/CSU had recorded considerable losses of votes. Alt-
hough the FDP is once again represented in the Bundestag,23, it refused, after failed coali-
tion negotiations, to participate in a government with the party Alliance 90 / The Greens 
(the largest green party in Germany) within the framework of a so-called "traffic light co-
alition.".  
 
Under the heading "Pact for the Rule of Law" and amid a commitment to a "strong 
state"24 and a "modern law,"25 the CDU/CSU and SPD have formulated the political goal 
of reforming the "sanctions law for companies"26 as follows: 
 
"We want to ensure that economic crime is effectively prosecuted and adequately 
punished. For this reason, we are reorganizing the law regarding sanctions for com-
panies. We shall ensure that, in principle, companies that benefit from the miscon-
duct of their employees are also subject to stronger sanctions in the event of eco-
nomic crime. […] By means of clear procedural rules, we shall also increase the legal 
certainty of the companies concerned. At the same time, we shall establish specific 
rules on the suspension of proceedings in order to give the judiciary the necessary 
flexibility in prosecution. We shall expand the range of sanctions available - the 
current maximum fine of up to ten million euros is too high for smaller companies 
and too low for large corporations. We shall ensure that, in the future, the amount 
of the fine is based on the economic strength of the company. For companies with 
a turnover of more than 100 million euros, the maximum limit is to be ten percent 
of turnover. We shall also create additional sanction instruments. In addition, we 
shall create concrete and comprehensible assessment rules for monetary sanctions 
for companies. The sanctions are to be made public by appropriate means. In order 
to create legal certainty for all parties involved, we shall create legal requirements 
for internal investigations, especially with regard to seized documents and options 
for engaging in searches. We shall create legal incentives for clarification assistance 
			
23  The FDP received 10.7% of the votes cast. 
24  Similarly Koalitionsvertrag der Bundesregierung der 19. Legislaturperiode p. 123; available at: 
https://www.bundesregierung.de/re-
source/blob/656734/847984/5b8bc23590d4cb2892b31c987ad672b7/2018-03-14-koalitionsvertrag-
data.pdf?download=1, (Nov. 18, 2019, 02:28 PM). 
25  Similarly Koalitionsvertrag der Bundesregierung der 19. Legislaturperiode S. 130; abrufbar unter: 
https://www.bundesregierung.de/re-
source/blob/656734/847984/5b8bc23590d4cb2892b31c987ad672b7/2018-03-14-koalitionsvertrag-
data.pdf?download=1, (Nov. 18, 2019, 05:21 PM). 
26  Further legal policy background to the Coalition Agreement, Emanuel Ballo & Marcus Reischl, Der Koaliti-
onsvertrag 2018 – Neue Impulse für die Reform des Sanktionsrechts für Unternehmen, COMBLIANCE BERA-
TER, 189 et seq (2018). 
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by means of 'internal investigations' and subsequent disclosure of the find-
ings made."27 
 
The bill now presented by the office of Justice Minister Christine Lambrecht (SPD) is 
continuing the criminal policy line of the SPD. The invented word "Ver-
bandssanktionengesetz" (Associations Sanctions Act), with which the draft of the Act on 
Combating Corporate Crime was overwritten, is merely an attempt at verbal appease-
ment28. It disguises the fact that this comprises criminal sanctions and criminal proceed-
ings against companies.29 
 
In the last elections to the Bundestag in 2017, the SPD achieved its worst result in a Bun-
destag election (with 20.5 percent of the votes cast) and since that time has been anxious 
about its status as the people's party. The question of whether another grand coalition led 
by the CDU/CSU should be formed was controversial within the party. The demand for 
a tough crackdown on economic crime represents an attempt to occupy a topic relevant 
to voters and to make visible the influence of the SPD on the policies of the federal gov-
ernment. Traditionally, there have been relevant differences between the parties in terms 
of criminal policy positions. While left-wing parties demand a sense of proportion in the 
prosecution of criminality based on misery, street crime and juvenile delinquency and ad-
vocate subject-specific (for example, fare evasion, shoplifting or drug-related crime) alter-
natives to criminal law and decriminalization , they see a need to catch up in the fight 
against crime by persons with high status and the prosecution of companies, and put 
more emphasis on prosecution and sanctioning. The opposite is true for conservative par-
ties. These follow the maxim "tough on crime" with "crimes in the streets." On the other 
hand, with the pursuit of "white-collar-crime," greater restraint is touted. The pivot of the 
CDU/CSU to the criminal policy line of the SPD30 is explained as a concession to the 
coalition partners and as a bow to the zeitgeist. The concern is to show the muscles of a 
strong state and a powerful judiciary in the face of general social insecurity.31 			
27  Similarly Koalitionsvertrag der Bundesregierung der 19. Legislaturperiode p. 126; available at: 
https://www.bundesregierung.de/re-
source/blob/656734/847984/5b8bc23590d4cb2892b31c987ad672b7/2018-03-14-koalitionsvertrag-
data.pdf?download=1, (Nov. 18, 2019, 05:23 PM). 
28  Similarly, Ralf Kölbel, Kriminologischer Kommentar zum Kölner Entwurf eines Verbandssanktionengesetzes, 
NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS-, STEUER- UND UNTERNEHMENSSTRAFRECHT, 407 (411) et seq. 
(2018), regarding a Cologne draft of an association sanctions law submitted by criminal law scholars: " termi-
nologische Kaschierung"; Elisa Hoven & Thomas Weigend justify the wording in the Cologne draft with "the 
fact that the less controversial term is expected to be more accepted in legal policy regards," in: Elisa Hoven & 
Thomas Weigend, Der Kölner Entwurf eines Verbandssanktionengesetzes, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSPOLI-
TIK, 30 (31) (2018). 
29  The draft sees itself as a "third lane" between criminal and administrative offenses law, see Draft Act, p. 56, 70, 
see also Alexander Baur & Philipp Maximilian Holle, Entwurf eines Verbandssanktionengesetzes – Eine erste 
Einordnung, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSPOLITIK, 186, 189f. (2019). 
30  See the 2013 draft from North Rhine-Westphalia under Justice Minister Kutschaty (SPD). 
31  More specifically on this: TOBIAS SINGELNSTEIN & PEER STOLLE, DIE SICHERHEITSGESELLSCHAFT: SOZI-
ALE KONTROLLE IM 21. JAHRHUNDERT (3rd end. 2012); ORTWIN RENN, GEFÜHLTE WAHRHEITEN. ORI-
ENTIERUNG IN ZEITEN POSTFAKTISCHER VERUNSICHERUNG (1st end. 2019). 
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III. CONTENT OF THE DRAFT ACT 
 
A. Expansion of German Corporate Criminal Law in Foreign Matters 
 
In 69 paragraphs, the draft contains provisions in the areas of sanctions, procedural law 
and register law. The starting point for the liability of associations under criminal law is 
the association offense. This is given, comparable to the previous provision in § 30 OWiG, 
if a criminal offense has been committed in accordance with the provisions of German 
core and secondary criminal law and either the association has been enriched or is to be 
enriched or duties that affect the association have been violated (§ 2 (1)(3) Draft Act).  
 
As such, the Act does not extend the catalog of possible offenses. In this respect, the same 
conditions that are applicable to proceedings against natural persons apply. Moreover, 
according to the general rules (territoriality principle, § 3 of the German Criminal Code 
(Strafgesetzbuch, "StGB"); personality principle, § 7 StGB), German criminal law must be 
applicable to begin with. With regard to criminal jurisdiction, the Draft Act goes one step 
further than the criminal prosecution of natural persons. According to § 2 (2) Draft Act, 
an association offense is to be equivalent to an act "to which German criminal law is not 
applicable, if the act would be a criminal offense under German criminal law, if the act is 
liable to criminal penalties at the site of the act or if the site of the act is not subject to 
penal power" and "the association at the time of the act has a registered office in Germany 
[...]." The reason given for this extension of German penal power to foreign circum-
stances is that multinational corporations based in Germany should not be able to evade 
punishment for foreign offenses committed by foreign employees. This gap in the exist-
ing law must be closed. 
 
B. Attribution 
 
Not every association offense committed by an employee leads to criminal liability on the 
part of the association. An offense is attributed to an association only if it was committed 
by a "person in leadership position" (Leitungsperson) (§ 3 (1)(1) Draft Act) or "if managing 
persons of the association could have prevented the offense or made it considerably more 
difficult by taking appropriate precautions to avoid association offenses, such as in par-
ticular organization, selection, instruction and supervision" (§ 3 (1)(2) Draft Act). 
 
C. Competence 
 
The public prosecutors' office, which is also responsible for prosecuting offenses commit-
ted by an association, is responsible for prosecuting association offenses falling within the 
scope of the Act (§ 24 Draft Act). The principle of legality applies (§ 25 (1), § 36 et seq. 
Draft Act). As such, the prosecution of a company is not left to the discretion of the crim-
inal prosecution authority, but takes place ex officio if there is an initial suspicion. The 
provisions of the opportunity principle apply accordingly (§ 37 Draft Act). In the pro-
ceedings, the association assumes the role of the defendant (§ 28 Draft Act). 
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D. Sanctions 
 
The draft also provides for a comprehensive catalog of sanctions. The focus is on the "as-
sociation monetary sanction" (§ 8 (1) Draft Act), the amount of which differentiates ac-
cording to intent and negligence and the annual turnover (§ 9 (1), (2) Draft Act). In the 
case of an average annual turnover of more than 100 million euros, the association mone-
tary sanction in the case of an intentional association offense amounts to at least 10,000 
euros and a maximum of 10 percent of the average annual turnover (§ 9 (2) Draft Act). In 
accordance with § 9 (2) Draft Act, the following applies: "In determining the average an-
nual turnover, the worldwide turnover of all natural persons and associations of the last 
three fiscal years preceding the conviction shall be taken as the basis, to the extent that 
such persons and associations operate with the association as one economic unit." Under 
certain conditions, § 14 of the draft also provides for the "dissolution of the association." 
Furthermore, § 15 Draft Act provides for the public announcement of the conviction "in 
the case of a large number of injured parties." 
 
E. Monitoring Measures 
 
As an alternative to a conviction of an association sanction, the law also provides for a 
warning with the reservation of a penalty (§ 10 Draft Act). In such a case, the court can 
issue conditions and instructions. The instructions pursuant to § 13 Draft Act may include 
taking compliance measures to prevent future association offenses and proving such "pre-
cautions by certification of an expert body" (§ 13 (2) Draft Act). The provision is based on 
U.S. criminal law and the prosecution of FCPA violations. In the relevant proceedings of 
the Department of Justice (DOJ), a settlement (deferred prosecution agreement) is often 
reached. The company has clarified the facts through an internal investigation submitted 
to the DOJ and is urged, among other things, to improve its compliance management 
system as part of the settlement. In doing so, the company is provided with an "independ-
ent compliance monitor," which accompanies and monitors the implementation of the 
measures. If the requirements are fulfilled, the company is certified as compliant by the 
monitor and the measure is deemed to be terminated.32  
 
According to the provisions of the Draft Act, the company is to select the "competent 
body." However, the appointment requires the consent of the court (§ 13 (2) Draft Act). 
The costs are borne by the company, with which a mandate agreement is concluded. 
 
 
 
 
 
 			
32  For the figure of the "monitor" in U.S. law, see Benno Schwarz, FCPA Compliance Monitorships - US Marotte 
or Flavor of the New Times? Practical experience with FCPA compliance monitorships, CORPORATE COMPLI-
ANCE ZEITSCHRIFT, 189 – 193 (2019). 
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F. Internal Investigations 
 
Several provisions are dedicated to internal investigations.33 The conducting of internal 
investigations is rewarded with an optional mitigation of penalties, § 18 Draft Act. The 
conducting of internal investigations, which can lead to a reduction in penalties, is then 
linked to conditions that are described by indefinite legal terms. The internal investiga-
tion must have "essentially" contributed to the fact that the act was cleared up. Coopera-
tion with the investigating authorities within the framework of the internal investigation 
must have been "unrestricted." The "essential" documents must have been made available 
after the completion of the internal investigation. Furthermore, the mitigation of penal-
ties presupposes that the person carrying out the work has not at the same time assumed 
the role of defense counsel for the company or individual. According to § 42 Draft Act, 
the conducting of an internal investigation may also lead to a suspension of the prosecu-
tion for the time being. 
 
G. Procedural Provisions 
 
For legal practice, it is highly problematic that, in Germany, there is no wide-ranging "legal 
privilege" and no freedom from seizure according to the "work product doctrine."34 Un-
der the current legal situation, only communication between the defense counsel and his 
client is subject to wide-ranging freedom from seizure pursuant to § 97 (1)(1) of the Ger-
man Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung, "StPO"). Records of the defense 
counsel's communications entrusted to him by his client can likewise not be seized, § 97 
(1)(2) StPO. Other objects, for example documents handed over to the defense counsel by 
third parties, are also not subject to seizure, § 97 (1)(3) StPO.  
 
From the principle of the freedom from seizure of "other" documents just mentioned, a 
practice-relevant exception is made simply according to the applicable legal situation. Ac-
cording to prevailing opinion, documents relating to internal investigations (for example, 
reports, interview minutes and other evidence) are not subject to the protection of §  97 
(1)(3) StPO35, because the client of the internal investigation is usually not the defendant, 
and there is no relationship of trust between the defendant and the law firm conducting 
the internal investigation. After the planned legal changes in the course of the Draft Act, 			
33  On the topic of internal investigations, see Folker Bittmann, Internal Investigations Under German Law, 
COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 1 (1), 74 et seq. (2015); Christian Pelz, Ambiguities in International Internal 
Investigations, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 2 (1), 14-25 (2016); Sascha Süße & Carolin Püschel, Collect-
ing Evidence in Internal Investigations in the Light of Parallel Criminal Proceedings, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE 
JOURNAL, 2 (1), 26-58 (2016); Hendrik Schneider, The enterprise in testudo formation, COMPLIANCE EL-
LIANCE JOURNAL, 3 (1), 43-62 (2017). 
34  Hendrik Schneider, The enterprise in testudo formation, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 3 (1), 43-62 
820179; The differences between German and U.S. criminal proceedings are illustrated by Edward B. Diskant, 
Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability: Exploring the Uniquely American Doctrine Through Comparative 
Criminal Procedure, THE YALE LAW JOURNAL, 118 (1), 126 (150) et seq (2018). 
35  BVerfG, Beschluss vom 27.6.2018 – 2 BvR 1405/17, 2 BvR 1780/17; MICHAEL GREVEN, KARLSRUHER KOM-
MENTAR ZUR STPO (8th eds., Rolf Hannich), § 97, Rn. 14a (2019). 
		
	 COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |    VOLUME 5   NUMBER 2   2019 
PROF. DR. HENDRIK SCHNEIDER  |   DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH –		
THE DRAFT OF THE ACT ON COMBATING CORPORATE CRIME 
 
PAGE  22 
this legal view,36 which was recently confirmed by federal constitutional law in the "Jones 
Day proceedings," is now to be enshrined in the Act. This is because, according to the new 
version of § 97 (1)(3) StPO, the scope of application of the law is to be limited to docu-
ments relating to a relationship of trust between the client and the defense counsel.   
 
The Draft Act leaves open the conclusions to be drawn from this legal situation in the 
event that the company is in the role of defendant. To be sure, § 25 (1) Draft Act states 
that the provisions of the German Code of Criminal Procedure must be applied to pro-
ceedings against the company. If the company makes use of a company defense counsel, 
it can therefore be assumed that the protection against seizure provided by § 97 StPO also 
applies in proceedings against the company. However, it can be presumed that the legis-
lator does not assume that the documents relating to internal investigations are seizure-
free, even in proceedings against the company. In any event, a distinction is to be drawn 
in this respect between the internal investigation carried out by the company defense 
counsel who is commissioned, and the investigation carried out by the law firm commis-
sioned to cooperate with the public prosecutors' office. Since, according to the concept of 
Draft Act, the latter acts as an "extended arm" of the public prosecutors' office, there will 
be no relationship of trust between it and the company in the role of defendant.   
 
It follows from this that, although the company enters into the status of defendant and 
becomes the object of preliminary proceedings, the Draft Act does not grant it an equality 
of arms within the scope of its defense. In summary, it can in fact be assumed that inter-
view records, compilations of documents and summary factual presentations in corre-
sponding "internal investigation reports" are subject to the access of the investigating au-
thority if they were not prepared directly by the company defense counsel, but by the 
persons with a duty of professional secrecy commissioned for the internal investigation. 
Moreover, the company's primary documents are not subject to freedom from seizure (see 
§ 97 (2)(2) StPO in the version of the Draft Act). 
IV. OPINION 
 
A. Absence of Fundamental Criticism 
 
Since the publication of the Draft Act within the framework of a press conference of the 
Ministry, the reports and information events regarding the draft Act have been over-
whelming, although it is only to enter into force two years after its pronouncement. So 
far, fundamental criticism of the project as such has largely failed to materialize.37 This is 			
36  BVerfG, Beschluss vom 27.6.2018 – 2 BvR 1405/17, 2 BvR 1780/17; MICHAEL GREVEN, KARLSRUHER KOM-
MENTAR ZUR STPO (8th eds., Rolf Hannich), § 97, Rn. 14a (2019). 
37  See, for example, the rather positive first classification in the operative part of Alexander Baur & Philipp Ma-
ximilian Holle, Entwurf eines Verbandssanktionengesetzes – Eine erste Einordnung, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
RECHTSPOLITIK, 186 (2019). 
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easy to understand among the voices from the legal profession, because, from the perspec-
tive of the compliance and internal investment industry, the Act represents a gift from 
the legislator in the form of a gigantic market.  
 
This is because the comments on the deficits with regard to freedom from seizure alone 
show that, in the future, a company will be well advised to conduct two internal investi-
gations relating to the initial suspicion of the investigating authority. In an initial proce-
dure, which may be conducted under the direction of the company defense counsel, the 
company clarifies the dimension of the compliance violation and compares the findings 
with the suspected situation according to the records. On this basis, it will decide whether 
to conduct a second internal investigation, the results of which will be made available to 
the investigating authorities in the hope of mitigating the penalty. In addition, companies 
will protect themselves – in the form of compliance management systems – against attrib-
ution according to the model of breach of supervisory duty and, in the event of criminal 
proceedings against the company, will need one or more company defense counsels in 
addition to the individual defense counsels. 
 
Even from the camp of university lecturers, criticism comes only sporadically.38 Insofar as 
German criminal science is concerned with the draft, its deals the details of individual 
provisions.39 In publications prior to the announcement of the Draft Act, only a few au-
thors, such as the emeritus Munich criminal law teacher Schünemann40, still offer re-
sistance to "overkill" in criminal law, and refer to the marketing strategies used by the apol-
ogists of corporate criminal law to advance their project. The sources from which the new 
"belief in criminal law" of criminal law scholars is feeding itself is unclear.41 In particular, 
the reason for which individuals are to be prevented from committing criminal offenses 
by the punishment imposed on the employer remains unclear. Whether preventive effects 
can be derived from the severity of the sanctions should also be clarified. This is because, 
as stated at the outset, companies are already subject to severe sanctions under the current 
legal situation42. It is possible that the preventive considerations with which the drafts of 
the most recent discussion phase and the present Draft Act are justified are merely pretext, 			
38  Frank Saliger & Michael Tsambikakis, Verbandssanktionen: Reform mit Augenmaß, BETRIEBSBERATER, 40, 
cover, I (2019). 
39  For example. Bartosz Makowicz, Die Reform des Rechts der Unternehmenssanktionen: Was ist Compliance? 
Das ist hier die Frage!, BETRIEBSBERATER, 39, cover, I (2019). 
40  Bernd Schünemann, Der Kampf ums Verbandsstrafrecht in dritter Neuauflage, der „Kölner Entwurf eines 
Verbandssanktionengesetzes“ und die Verwandlung von Kuratoren in Monitore – much ado about something, 
STRAFVERTEIDIGERFORUM, 317 et seq (2018). 
41  A critical examination of this new belief in criminal law can be found in Ralf Kölbel, Die dunkle Seite des 
Strafrechts – Eine Kriminologische Erwiderung auf die Pönalisierungsbereitschaft in der strafrechtlichen Krim-
inalpolitik, NEUE KRIMINALPOLITIK, 249 et seq. (2019). 
42  See Ralf Kölbel, Kriminologischer Kommentar zum Kölner Entwurf eines Verbandssanktionengesetzes, NEUE 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS-, STEUER- UND UNTERNEHMENSSTRAFRECHT, 407 et seq. (2018); accord-
ing to which the criminal policy program of the association sanctions act (in this respect it refers to the so-called 
" Kölner Entwurf eines Verbandssanktionengesetzes“) is based on a "rather weak empirical basis." 
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and that the real issue is retaliation or adaptation to the "need for punishment of the peo-
ple." Approaches in this regard are once again being advocated today in German criminal 
science, as if the critical discussion in the 1960s and 1970s had never existed (see Walter: 
"The law demands retaliation – the citizens as well"). 
 
B. Assessment of Penalties 
 
The draft is also open to challenge at the level of the assessment of penalties. The penalty 
range is linked to the economic performance of the company and therefore relates to its 
annual turnover. The fact that this is not sufficient as a limitation principle is shown by 
the comparison with fines in the StGB, which can be imposed – in lieu of imprisonment 
– for certain criminal offenses and is calculated according to the daily rate principle (§ 40 
StGB). According to its system, individual performance in the form of monthly income, 
which is taken into account at the level of the daily rate, is also important (§ 40 (2) StGB). 
In addition, however, the number of daily rates refers to another measuring principle, 
because a daily rate corresponds to one day's imprisonment in the correctional facility (§ 
43 StGB). The number of daily rates depends in turn on the penalty range of the criminal 
law put into effect and the guilt expressed in the criminal offense. This may not be ex-
ceeded with the number of daily rates.43 
 
Such a measuring principle is missing in the Draft Act. To put it bluntly, the principle of 
arbitrariness applies to the imposition of fines on associations, because, in particular, there 
is no provision for a link to the penalty range of the offenses committed by the offender. 
For negligent water pollution according to § 324 StGB, for which natural persons can be 
punished with imprisonment for up to three years or a fine, in principle, the same fine on 
the association can be considered as for manipulations according to the modus operandi 
of Dieselgate. 
 
C. Lack of Equality of Arms between Defense Counsel and Public Prosecutors' 
Office 
 
As already shown above, the Draft Act opens up far-reaching possibilities for the criminal 
prosecution and sanctioning of companies, which possibilities are oriented in principle to 
U.S. models. However, these far-reaching investigative and sanctioning powers of the 
state do not correspond to the respective far-reaching protection under U.S. law in ac-
cordance with "legal privilege" and the "work product doctrine." Therefore, as the Jones 
Day case impressively demonstrates, it is possible, both under current and future law, for 
law firms that have conducted internal investigations to be subject to searches, in order to 
seize the relevant documents44.  			
43  In depth on the scope and determination of fines: FRANZ STRENG, STRAFRECHTLICHE SANKTIONEN: DIE 
STRAFZUMESSUNG UND IHRE GRUNDLAGEN (3rd eds.), 63-80 (2012). 
44  Comprehensive classification of the legal situation in Markus Rieder & Jonas Menne, Internal Investigations 
– Legal Situation, Possible Options and Legal-Political Need for Action, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 
5 (1), 20 et seq (2019). 
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Accordingly, the "powerfulness" of the upcoming German corporate criminal law is ob-
viously asserting itself against the rule of law of proceedings. Therefore, those who let the 
company assume the role of the defendant on the basis of questionable arguments should 
at least grant it adequate opportunities for defense. 
